Naturalismus oder Dualismus?

In opposition to Beckermann's naturalism, I defend a concept of a »genuine mental causality«: there are processes (for instance speech-acts) which cannot be explained without the application of mental concepts like »I believe«, or »I want«. Yet this mental causality is in no way an immaterial causality, since it is always materially conditioned. Such a dualism is therefore not a cartesian dualism of material and immaterial entities, and there is no need for any form of a downward causation, which would be an immaterial process. An action is a uniform process, not an interaction of two processes, which is, however, both inexplicable without mental concepts and has material conditions at the same time. The laws required for the explanation of such processes are not physical laws with a deterministic force. I therefore hold that only this structure secures freedom and responsibility, which are not compatible with naturalism.

Ansgar Beckermann, Naturalismus – Entwurf eines wissenschaftlich fundierten Weltund Menschenbilds, Paderborn: Brill/mentis, 2021. 156 S.