Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)

Contents

S. I-II (2)

Matthias Fahn, W. Bentley MacLeod, Gerd Muehlheusser

Editorial Preface

S. 413-440 (28)

Jonathan Thomas, Tim Worrall

Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux

S. 441-469 (29)

W. Bentley MacLeod, James M. Malcomson

Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On

S. 470-499 (30)

George Baker, Robert Gibbons, Kevin J. Murphy

From Incentives to Control to Adaptation: Exploring Interactions between Formal and Relational Governance

S. 500-529 (30)

David A. Miller, Joel Watson

An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts

S. 530-561 (32)

David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

Relational Contracts: Reputation and Renegotiation

S. 562-578 (17)

Parikshit Ghosh, Debraj Ray

The Social Equilibrium of Relational Arrangements

S. 579-615 (37)

Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen

Cooperation versus Competition between Agents in Relational Contracts

S. 616-638 (23)

Jin Li, Niko Matouschek

Making and Breaking Promises when their Costs Are Private Information

S. 639-660 (22)

Marina Halac

Revealing the Value of Relationships

S. 661-672 (12)

Rocco Macchiavello, Ameet Morjaria

Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions

S. 673-700 (28)

David Huffman

Relational Contracting: Complementarities with Behavioral and Experimental Economics

S. 701-717 (17)