Cover von: A Note on Voting over Taxes with Tax Avoidance
Zhiyong An

A Note on Voting over Taxes with Tax Avoidance

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 71 (2015) / Heft 3, S. 407-414 (8)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/001522115X14331675558726
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
We study majority voting over taxes when tax avoidance is possible, focusing on the progressivity of effective tax burdens and how government policy can affect it. We show that: (1) whether effective tax burdens are progressive or not depends on the distribution of individuals' pre-tax income, the per capita government revenue requirement, and the government enforcement level; and (2) both a lower per capita government revenue requirement and a higher government enforcement level can help ensure that effective tax burdens are progressive.