Cover von: Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony
Chulyoung Kim

Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 173 (2017) / Heft 2, S. 209-238 (30)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245616X14664894246848
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasiongame framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert's advice. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off.