Cover von: Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency
Pinaki Bose, Soham Baksi, Marc T. Law

Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 177 (2021) / Heft 1, S. 120-134 (15)
Publiziert 04.12.2020
DOI 10.1628/jite-2020-0051
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of coercion can adversely affect the efficiency of the corresponding market transactions. This may justify banning the legal market for the additional service if it is regarded as obnoxious by society.