Cover von: Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption
Fabio Méndez

Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption

Rubrik: Article
Jahrgang 165 (2009) / Heft 3, S. 438-453 (16)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245609789472032
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
This paper presents a theoretical model in which governments regulate economic activity and individuals bypass the regulations by paying bribes to the public officials who monitor their businesses; the amount of the bribe is the subject of bargaining. The paper then introduces a policy that disrupts the bribe-bargaining process by rewarding public officials beyond what they would expect to receive if they accepted a bribe. This policy is referred to as bargaining disruption. The results of the model suggest that such policies can effectively combat corruption.