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Cover von: Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management
Christian Laux

Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 157 (2001) / Heft 4, S. 591-607 (17)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/0932456012974503
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
The paper analyzes the question who should be provided with incentives to acquire and reveal information about the quality of an investment proposal: the division manager, who derives private benefits of control from the project and always wants to invest, or the capital budgeting department, which has no personal interests in the decision. Interestingly, private benefits of control may reduce expected wage costs. In this case joint project evaluation and project management is optimal.