Cover von: Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information
Andrew McGee

Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 169 (2013) / Heft 2, S. 229-252 (24)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245613X13606733821557
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
  • Artikel PDF
  • lieferbar
  • 10.1628/093245613X13606733821557
Beschreibung
nformation makes the agent uncertain how her report influences the principal's decision. The agent's expectations regarding the principal's information and the relationship between the parties' information affect both the informativeness of communication from the agent and the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has the option to consult the agent or delegate to her.