Der iranische Atomkonflikt und die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie nach dem Nichtverbreitungsvertrag

In 2000 the public became aware that Iran had secretly started to establish a nuclear program which could be used for peaceful as well as for non-peaceful purposes. In February 2006, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to report the country's nuclear program to the UN Security Council due to Iran's persistent failure to fully cooperate with the organization. Because Iran did not comply with the UN Security Council's subsequent call for a suspension of all uranium enrichment and reprocessing related activities, sanctions were imposed on the country by the Security Council in December 2006, March 2007 and March 2008. Whereas Iran insists on its rights under public international law to the use of all means of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, calls for a reinterpretation of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would lead to a restriction of the use of so called dual-use technologies (such as uranium enrichment) become louder.Both the technology of uranium enrichment as well as the technology of reprocessing nuclear materials can be used for civil, as well as for military purposes. This leads to uncertainties as to how to distinguish between the peaceful and non-peaceful use of nuclear technology. These uncertainties are not clearly resolved by the NPT. Whereas on the one hand, the NPT stipulates that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the parties unalienable right to research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, at the same time it specifies that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party undertakes not to receive control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. While some commentators believe that the provisions of the NPT need to be interpreted in a manner which renders all sensitive dual-use technologies outside the scope of what is meant by a technology for peaceful purposes, such interpretations cannot be followed. This interpretation is solely based on a technology's objective characteristics and infers from the technology's mere potential for military use to its non-peaceful nature. Such interpretation would greatly restrict member states' unalienable rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and is thus neither covered by the principle of sovereign equality of all states, which is decisive for the NPT, nor by the treaty's history, wording, purpose and object or context. Rather, an interpretation according to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of sovereign equality of all states shows that only a member state's intent is decisive for the distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear technologies.To establish this intent and thus a nuclear program's civil or military character, recourse may be made to the fulfilment of a member state's obligations towards the IAEA. As the case of Iran shows, such conclusion can be difficult. One may consider this a loophole in the present non-proliferation regime. However, this loophole may only be reversed through treaty amendment, and not through a reinterpretation of the treaty based solely on a technology's objective capability to be used for civil as well as for military purposes.