Intertemporaler Schutz grundrechtlicher Freiheit

In a groundbreaking decision from 2021, the German federal constitutional court acknowledged an intertemporal guarantee of freedom. Since then, the decision and the newly discovered intertemporal guarantee of freedom have caused much debate. This essay engages in depth with the notion and its conceptualization and discusses their viability. It shows weaknesses in the court's concept and argues that the question of whether legal obligations towards future right-holders can be conceptualized is unavoidable. The court tries to establish that fundamental rights themselves bear an intertemporal dimension. This is not conceptually viable. An intertemporal protection of interests only arises in horizontal and vertical legal relationships that are established through fundamental rights. The misattribution makes it more difficult to see that legal obligations towards future right holders and future generations truly (and fully) anchor in fundamental rights. It also makes it harder to see that the court needs to correct its stance on the (a)symmetry of the fundamental rights protection of interests.