Legislativer Völkervertragsbruch im demokratischen Rechtsstaat

National statutes which are in conflict with international contractual obligations – and cannot be interpreted in accordance with international law – constitute a violation of international law by the state as a signatory. Despite this, the statute is consistent with the national constitution. In opposition to the opinion of the First Panel of the German Federal Tax Court, the unconstitutionality cannot be derived from the principle of the rule of law which is supposed to override the decision-making competence of parliament in individual cases and preclude any substantive legal amendments. Such an international-law-friendly imposition and activation of the rule-of-law principle is – rightly – not supported by the current case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The opinion of the First Panel is contrary to the distinction in Article 24 et seqq. of the German Constitution. A commitment of parliament to non-national sources of law has only been implemented concerning particular – historically explainable, factually comprehensible – areas. This article pointed out that and why international contractual obligations are not included therein. Regarding the historical conception of the German constitution, such obligations shall not contain a national, constitutionally effective power by an international-law-friendly interpretation. This finding shapes the specification of the rule-of-law principle. There is no conflict between the principles of democracy and the rule of law (contrary to the opinion of the First Panel and parts of the academic literature), one can rather adopt an understanding of the rule of law that does not allow rivalry or even a conflict in the first place. However, even if such a conflict is assumed it has to be solved in favor of a parliamentary competence which is not restricted by obligations based on international law.