Susumu Cato, Toshihiro Matsumura
Long-Run Effects of Tax Policies in a Mixed Market
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
- Artikel PDF
- lieferbar
- 10.1628/001522113X666944
Aufgrund einer Systemumstellung kann es vorübergehend u.a. zu Zugriffsproblemen kommen. Wir arbeiten mit Hochdruck an einer Lösung. Wir bitten um Entschuldigung für die Umstände.
Beschreibung
Personen
Rezensionen
Beschreibung
The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of tax policies in mixed markets with endogenous entry. We consider three types of tax-subsidy policies: a simple unit subsidy, an entry-license tax, and a policy mixture of the two instruments. Under the unit-subsidy policy, in contrast to the results of the short-run analysis with exogenous entry, the optimal subsidy level in a mixed market is not higher than that in a private market, and privatization affects welfare. Under the entry-license-tax policy, the optimal entry-tax level in a mixed market is lower than that in a private market. Finally, we show that the privatization neutrality theorem holds under a two-part tax--subsidy policy: the first-best outcome is achieved in both mixed and private markets, and the optimal tax-subsidy rate is the same across the two regimes.