Cover von: Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, Michael Klausner

Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 162 (2006) / Heft 1, S. 5-20 (16)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245606776166543
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
Outside directors of public companies play a central role in overseeing management. Nonetheless, they have rarely incurred personal, out-of-pocket liability for failing to carry out their assigned tasks, either in the litigation-prone United States or other countries. Historically, as threats to this near-zero personal liability regime have appeared, market and political forces have responded to restore the status quo. We suggest here reasons to believe that this arrangement is justifiable from a policy perspective, at least in countries where reputation and other extra-legal mechanisms provide reasonable incentives for outside directors to be vigilant.