Cover von: Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak

Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 173 (2017) / Heft 4, S. 565-590 (26)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245616X14799744684614
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the alternative-vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent plurality rule. We show that, like the plurality rule, the alternative-vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the alternative-vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, approval voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization than the plurality rule. (JEL: C72, D72, D78)