Cover von: The Reforms of Shang Yang
Haiwen Zhou

The Reforms of Shang Yang

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 180 (2024) / Heft 4, S. 626-647 (22)
Publiziert 05.11.2024
DOI 10.1628/jite-2024-0032
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
Shang Yang is regarded as the chief architect of the Chinese state. This paper analyzes the reforms of Shang Yang in a mathematical model. The existence of institutional complementarity between the adoption of the county form and the use of strong incentives for soldiers is established. An increase in the level of external threats induces the ruler to adopt stronger incentives for soldiers and to choose a higher degree of adopting the county form. An increase in the power of clans leads the ruler to choose a lower incentive for soldiers and a lower level of adopting the county form.