Cover von: The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property
Martin Kolmar, Kristoffel Grechenig

The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property

Rubrik: Article
Jahrgang 170 (2014) / Heft 1, S. 5-23 (19)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245614X13871984731004
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.