Cover von: Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation
Guillaume Cheikbossian, Michel Cavagnac

Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 171 (2015) / Heft 2, S. 330-354 (25)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245615X14273596659044
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast with those obtained in a laissez-faire economy. Under quantity competition, a merger is always profitable to the host country and can also be profitable to the competing country if products are sufficiently differentiated. Under price competition, a merger is always profitable to both countries – but it is more profitable to the host country.