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Cover of: A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment
Kazuhiro Ohnishi

A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment

Section: Articles
Volume 62 (2006) / Issue 1, pp. 108-123 (16)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/001522106776667013
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  • 10.1628/001522106776667013
Summary
This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a social-welfare-maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.