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Cover of: Adaptive Preferences and Institutional Stability
Carl Christian von Weizsäcker

Adaptive Preferences and Institutional Stability

Section: Article
Volume 170 (2014) / Issue 1, pp. 27-36 (10)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245614X13871986329207
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  • 10.1628/093245614X13871986329207
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Summary
Two theorems are presented that show the following: Assume that preferences are influenced by past consumption. If and only if preferences are adaptive, it is the case that all improvement sequences are acyclic and thus can be a basis for doing welfare economics. It is further argued that adaptive preferences are a prerequisite for the stability and legitimacy of institutions. Thus, welfare economics is possible whenever institutions are reasonably stable and therefore legitimized. The anthropology corresponding to the hypothesis of adaptive preferences has already been enunciated by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.