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Cover of: Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels
Kaiwen Leong, Saori Chiba

Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels

Section: Articles
Volume 172 (2016) / Issue 4, pp. 727-754 (28)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245616X14631368691817
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Summary
Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can correlate with an increase in the total number of criminal actions. To examine this phenomenon, we develop a dynamic model of »personal rules« in which forgetfulness and hyperbolic discounting together can cause a potential criminal to commit more crimes as the probability of apprehension increases. At the time of the future decision, he may commit a crime due to hyperbolic discounting, even if it is not profitable. Hence, he may choose not to commit a crime today as a commitment device to abstain from crime in the future. However, increased prosecution can limit the effectiveness of the commitment device.