Between Jewish Law and State Law: Rethinking Hermann Cohen's Critique of Spinoza

A reconsideration of the famous dispute between Cohen and Spinoza reveals surprising agreement on the very question on which dispute seems to center: how to evaluate philosophically the categories of religion and law. Cohen and Spinoza differ on the interpretation of Judaism, but they largely agree that religious law is philosophically valuable only on the basis of its universal moral significance. Although Cohen both defends Judaism as a moral religion and elevates the role of law within his philosophical system, he does not offer a defense of Jewish law as such. Like Spinoza, he distinguishes sharply between the philosophical value of religious law and political law. Recognizing these similarities between Spinoza and Cohen on law also illuminates Spinoza's more nuanced relationship to law than his naturalism and his critique of positive Jewish law often suggest. Cohen and Spinoza differ most not on Jewish law, but on the ultimate philosophical significance of political law.