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Cover of: Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Nonrival Goods
Martin Kolmar

Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Nonrival Goods

Section: Articles
Volume 171 (2015) / Issue 3, pp. 405-431 (27)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245615X14113700937442
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Summary
We analyze the optimal relationship between the public and private enforcement of property rights for the case of rival and nonrival goods. Exclusion is interpreted as a costly activity, which allows it to endogenize the distinctions between public and club goods on the one hand and between private and common-pool goods on the other. We characterize optimality conditions for the private provision of rival and nonrival goods, characterize optimal enforcement policies, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives.