Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert
Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate
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- 10.1628/093245612804469764
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The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on expert advice. Such advice typically originates in a due-diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint venture's profitability, for example, by appraising the achievability of synergies. We show that if the experts who advise the owners considering forming an R&D joint venture are also responsible for R&D efforts, they can have incentives to withhold information about the extent of those synergies. Owners optimally react by reducing the incentives to innovate in low-value projects developed within R&D joint ventures and in high-value projects developed within competing research organizations.