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Cover of: Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
Changying Li, Jianhu Zhang

Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly

[D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly]
Section: Articles
Volume 169 (2013) / Issue 4, pp. 660-679 (20)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245613X671184
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  • 10.1628/093245613X671184
Summary
Based on a Hotelling-type model, this paper analyzes a differential game where two firms engage in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D). The analysis is formulated in terms of open-loop and feedback solutions. We find that the open-loop stationary levels of R&D and quality are socially efficient. Moreover, compared to open-loop strategies, feedback strategies lead to higher stationary levels of prices and profits, but lower levels of R&D, quality, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, compared to the social optimum, both open-loop and feedback strategies yield a closer stationary distance between the two firms.