Sang-Hyun Kim, Chulyoung Kim, Youjin Hahn
Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests
- article PDF
- available
- 10.1628/jite-2021-0018
Due to a system change, access problems and other issues may occur. We are working with urgency on a solution. We apologise for any inconvenience.
Summary
Authors/Editors
Reviews
Summary
We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their proposal rights than others. We also present and analyze additional behavioral patterns observed in our proposal rights contest experiment.