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Cover of: Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders: Why are they So Hard to Explain?
Thomas J. Miceli

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders: Why are they So Hard to Explain?

Section: Articles
Volume 169 (2013) / Issue 4, pp. 587-604 (18)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245613X671193
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  • 10.1628/093245613X671193
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Summary
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are a pervasive feature of punishment schemes in various contexts, but economic theory has had a hard time rationalizing the practice. This paper reviews the literature on escalating penalties, and then develops a theory based on uncertainty on the part of enforcers about offenders' gains from committing socially undesirable acts. The analysis derives the conditions under which escalating penalties are both optimal (cost-minimizing) and subgame-perfect. It goes on to discuss several extensions and qualifications.