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Cover of: Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs
Eberhard Feess, Markus Walzl

Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs

Section: Articles
Volume 166 (2010) / Issue 4, pp. 573-590 (18)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245610793524910
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  • 10.1628/093245610793524910
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Summary
We analyze whether corporate leniency programs should grant full immunity to the first self-reporting firm regardless of the amount of evidence provided. We distinguish between two firms, one of them providing high and one only low evidence. We show that awarding full amnesty also to the low evidence provider is suboptimal. Distinguishing fines between the two firms leads to the same percentage of self-reporting and to a lower cartel frequency. For the high evidence provider, full amnesty can but does not have to be optimal.