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Cover of: Institutional Bias towards the Status Quo
Dalibor S. Eterovic

Institutional Bias towards the Status Quo

Section: Article
Volume 167 (2011) / Issue 3, pp. 489-514 (26)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245611797215512
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  • 10.1628/093245611797215512
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Summary
Our model presents an underexamined element of policy reform and institutional quality, showing how the characteristics of the political system may render citizens unable to properly reward politicians who implement new projects, thus favouring politicians who secure the status quo, albeit mediocre, of the economy. Political institutions matter because they affect the value of holding office for the politician. Societies with a low-quality political system may present institutional bias towards the status quo. This bias arises from the inability of the citizens to design an effective voting rule that induces the politician to implement new projects successfully.