Back to issue
Cover of: Lobby Interaction and Trade Policy
Tatyana Chesnokova

Lobby Interaction and Trade Policy

Section: Articles
Volume 170 (2014) / Issue 4, pp. 749-765 (17)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245614X13996266050522
  • article PDF
  • available
  • 10.1628/093245614X13996266050522
Summary
The paper introduces interaction between organized lobbies in the protection-for-sale framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions such that the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the protection-for-sale model, not only the proportion of the population that owns capital in the organized sectors, but also the number of lobbies, matters for trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has a nonmonotone effect on each lobby's contribution.