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Cover of: Merger and Collusion in Contests
Kai A. Konrad, Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller

Merger and Collusion in Contests

Section: Articles
Volume 158 (2002) / Issue 4, pp. 563-575 (13)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/0932456022975277
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  • 10.1628/0932456022975277
Summary
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.