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Cover of: Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms
Amrish Patel, Edward Cartwright

Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms

Section: Articles
Volume 168 (2012) / Issue 2, pp. 280-289 (10)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245612800933942
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  • 10.1628/093245612800933942
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Summary
In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.