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Cover of: Plurality Rule, Majority Principle and Indeterminacy in German Elections
Salvatore Barbaro, Nils D. Steiner

Plurality Rule, Majority Principle and Indeterminacy in German Elections

Section: Articles
Volume 79 (2023) / Issue 1, pp. 64-91 (28)
Published 17.03.2023
DOI 10.1628/fa-2023-0001
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  • 10.1628/fa-2023-0001
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Summary
In German federal elections, district representatives are chosen by plurality rule – a voting system that can fail to select the Condorcet winner. With heightened party system fragmentation, violations of the Condorcet criterion may become increasingly frequent. In light of the »horseshoe theory«, it also becomes questionable whether Condorcet winners exist in the first place. In this study, we simulate preference orderings over district candidates for the 2017 Bundestag election based on survey data. The simulation identifies Condorcet winners in every district and indicates that plurality rule fails to select those in about one in ten districts.