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Cover of: Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?
Giovanni Anania, Rosanna Nisticò

Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?

Section: Articles
Volume 160 (2004) / Issue 4, pp. 681-701 (21)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/0932456042776113
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Summary
Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.