Program
Subjects
Works
Book Types
Back to issue
Cover of: Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach
Werner Güth

Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach

Section: Articles
Volume 167 (2011) / Issue 4, pp. 608-612 (5)
Published 04.10.2018
DOI 10.1628/jite-2011-0004
  • article PDF
  • available
  • 10.1628/jite-2011-0004
Due to a system change, access problems and other issues may occur. We are working with urgency on a solution. We apologise for any inconvenience.
Summary
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids, which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-price auction and fair-division game.