Cover of: Self-Promoting Investments
Carolyn Pitchik

Self-Promoting Investments

Section: Articles
Volume 164 (2008) / Issue 3, pp. 381-406 (26)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245608785363416
  • article PDF
  • available
  • 10.1628/093245608785363416
Summary
If a worker's output is observed by the market only when the worker invests in self-promoting activities, then workers overinvest in self-promotion. The efficient contract is one in which firms (i) offer to match outside offers strategically and (ii) guarantee a minimum wage. The model predicts that, in the spot market and under the efficient contract, wage declines with seniority even when conditioning on high ability. This prediction is consistent with the stylized fact regarding the decline of wages with seniority in academia. The model can also explain how the seniority wage premium may vary across disciplines, time, and schools.