SEP mit FRAND-Erklärung – aktuelle Fragen nach Huawei/ZTE

With the decision Huawei v. ZTE the CJEU choreographed an obligatory negotiation dance for SEP patent owners and implementers which has to be passed before an action for a prohibitory injunction can be brought. While the CJEU's decision clarified that it is the SEP owner who has to make the first step and alert the alleged infringer and present to him a specific written offer for a license on FRAND terms in accordance with the undertaking given to the standardization body, new questions arose as to each and every new dancing step. This article summarizes some of the most relevant discussions regarding the obligations of SEP patent owner and implementer and tries to give some answers to the new questions about the alert, the FRAND offer and counteroffer as well as new procedural tactics. As a starting point it must always be borne in mind that the companies engaged in the standardization form a cartel in the sense of Art. 101 TFEU which is only permitted under the conditions set forth in Art. 101 (3) TFEU. Thus, in the SEP scenario the control of the SEP owners who are in a dominant position pursuant to Art. 102 TFEU is replacing the bargain of a license rate between parties on a level playing field. This must be borne in mind when trying to find out what FRAND actually is. Die Frage, welche Grenzen der Durchsetzung von standardessentiellen Patenten gesetzt sind und welche Pflichten sich für den Patentinhaber aus seiner FRAND-Erklärung bzw. aus Art. 102 AEUV und § 19 GWB ergeben, dürfte nicht nur das derzeit am heißesten diskutierte Thema des Patentrechts sein, sondern auch das praktisch bedeutsamste. Nachfolgend soll nach einen Blick auf die Besonderheiten von SEP und deren Zustandekommen aufgezeigt werden, welche neuen Probleme das vom EuGH in der Vorabentscheidung Huawei/ZTE aufgezeigte Prozedere bereitet.