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Cover of: The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy
Yves Oytana

The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy

Section: Articles
Volume 170 (2014) / Issue 3, pp. 537-570 (34)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245614X14017020626304
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  • 10.1628/093245614X14017020626304
Summary
We study how the presence of biased expertise influences judicial decision-making. When an appeals-court judge's decision depends only on the information he gets about the expertise proceedings, a perfectly separating equilibrium may arise in which the losing litigant appeals only if the trial-court judge's decision is incorrect. Surprisingly enough, an increase in the probability that the expertise is biased and a decrease in the level of scrutiny of the appeals court may be beneficial. When the appeals-court judge uses a Bayesian mechanism to make his decision, a perfectly separating equilibrium never exists.