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Cover of: The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies
Attila Tasnádi, Barna Bakó

The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies

Section: Articles
Volume 173 (2017) / Issue 4, pp. 753-768 (16)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245617X14875974729938
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Summary
We extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved. We also investigate the case of public Stackelberg leadership and that of private Stackelberg leadership. (JEL: D43, H44, L13, L32)