Cover of: The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions
Julia Müller, Thorsten Upmann

The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions

Section: Articles
Volume 170 (2014) / Issue 2, pp. 336-364 (29)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245614X13941110635976
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Summary
We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent union – and in some cases even both groups are worse off under a joint union. Consequently, a joint union must be considered as a rather unstable institution. Correspondingly, profits are lower if the firm bargains with two independent craft unions.