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Cover of: Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods
Alessandro Balestrino, Dan Anderberg, Fredrik Andersson

Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods

Section: Articles
Volume 57 (2001) / Issue 2, pp. 137-154 (18)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/0015221012904968
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Summary
Many public goods generate utility only when combined with a time-input. Important examples include road networks and publicly provided leisure facilities. If it is possible to charge for the time spent using the public good it is generally a second-best Pareto optimal policy to do so even in the absence of congestion. An optimal linear user charge is analyzed within a standard optimum income-tax framework. Second-best public good provision in the presence of a user charge is also characterized and factors that influence the direction of optimal distortion of the public good supply are identified.