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Cover of: Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Bruno Deffains

Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process

Section: Articles
Volume 163 (2007) / Issue 4, pp. 627-656 (30)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245607783242990
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Summary
There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject to uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, the law is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates in a model of tort litigation, study how they are affected by different policies, and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking.